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Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent*
James L. Dennis-
In Louisiana, where the civil law meets the common, judges steeped in both
traditions write opinions only in Anglo-American style, giving elaborate
statements of facts and discussions of precedents--even when interpreting and
applying the Civil Code. Although common-law methodology is not well suited
to this civil-law purpose, our courts have not adequately developed distinct
techniques for interpreting and applying the civil code and dealing with judicial
precedent in that process. There appear to be at least two reasons for the lack
of progress in our civil-law methodology.
First, the civil-law sources from which a separate civilian judicial
methodology could be fashioned are not easy to access or to adapt to our mixed
civil/common-law system. In this lecture I will attempt to explain how the
seminal works of French and German civil-law scholars could be drawn upon to
further develop a Louisiana civil-law judicial technique.
Further, although Louisiana judges are called upon to perform as civil-law
jurists, and indeed must do so in order to be completely faithful to the Civil
Code as substantive law, they also function as Anglo-American judges and share
many attributes with their common-law colleagues. Their legal education
includes, in addition to civil code subjects, common-law courses taught by the
case method with emphasis on analysis of facts and policy. In the field of
judicial process, they are exposed to little other than Anglo-American
methodology. They are influenced by a system of reporting and digesting cases
which mirrors and supports traditional common-law habits and thoughts about
judicial process, as in the United States generally.' The system by which
Louisiana judges are recruited-popular election from the ranks of practitioners
and public officials-tends to produce judges with strong personalities and to
encourage them to leave their mark on the law, following the example of great
Anglo-American judges, rather than that of the more anonymous Continental
jurists.2  Because little can or should be done to change these judicial
characteristics, Louisiana jurists must be mindful of them and guard against
allowing them to interfere with their duty to support the Civil Code as part of the
law of the state.
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Because of our cross-training, Louisiana judges are knowledgeable in both
civil and common law. We generally have the ability to operate with ease in
both systems.3 There is a draw back in this judicial switch-hitting program,
however, that we have not completely figured out. We understand well how
precedents, ratio decidendi, and holdings work in the common law. Despite
considerable effort over the years, however, we still do not have a clear view of
the role that our common-law style opinions should have as precedents in cases
to be decided under the Civil Code.' Jurists agree that the role and impact of
jurisprudence must be different on the civil- and common-law sides of our legal
system. But so far, there has been little articulation of theory or methodology
by which a judge can determine how influential a previously decided case should
be in a subsequent case under the Civil Code.
In this lecture, I will attempt to outline a theory of how the decisions of our
appellate courts that interpret and apply the Civil Code should be regarded and
used by our judges in subsequent civil-law cases. This is a task which should
be undertaken not merely out of a fear that our jurisdiction might eventually lose
its "civilian heritage" by adopting common-law techniques.' Rather, it merits
our attention because it is our duty to develop realistic and fitting methods for
the administration of the Civil Code as well as other areas of our diverse legal
system. Furthermore, judges, by their oaths, owe litigants and the public
consistent, faithful and equal application of the legislated laws.
6
3. Jean-Louis Baudouin, The hnpact of the Common Law on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana
and Quebec, in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions
3 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974). Professor Baudouin further notes that "[tlhis does not, however,
necessarily imply that they are true comparatists, for being a comparatist implies the ability to judge
one's own system through another; and in [Louisiana and Quebec] the system of reference is, to a
certain degree, already integrated in the object of comparison." Id.
4. Id. at 10 (citing, relevant to the Louisiana experience, Harriet S. Daggett et al., A
Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Low of Louisiana, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 12 (1937); Joseph
Dainow, The Method of Legal Development through Judicial hterpretation in Louisiana and Puerto
Rico, 22 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 108 (1952); H.F. Jolowicz, The Civil Law in Louisiana, 29 Tul. L. Rev.
491 (1955); Clarence J. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for
State and Nation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 537 (1943); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in
Different Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 475 (1933); C. Girard Davidson, Comment, Stare Decisis
in Louisiana, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 100 (1932); Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial hIterpretation in
Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727 (1962); John H. Tucker, Jr., The Code and the Common Law in
Louisiana, 29 Tul. L. Rev. 739 (1955); David W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions
of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. 78 (1968); Albert Tate, Jr.. Civilian
Methodology in Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673 (1970); Joe W. Sanders, The "Civil Lw" in the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 15 La. B.J. 15 (1967); Gordon Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System
Reappraised, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 585 (1937); Clarence J. Morrow, Civilian Codification under Judicial
Review: The Generality ofhImuortality in Louisiana, 21 Tul. L. Rev. 545 (1947); Robert A. Pascal
and W. Thomas Tete, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term: Low
in General: The Obligatory Force of Decisions, 31 La. L. Rev. 185 (1971)).
5. Id. at 1.
6. La. Const. art. X. 4 30.
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The basic ideas of the theory of civil-law precedent that I propose are
simple. A previously decided case under the Civil Code, even in Anglo
trappings, stands for something different than a case in a case-law system. In the
common law, judicial precedent plays a leading role, serving both as a source of
law and as an example of a prior judge's methodology in reasoning from the
case-law materials. On the other hand, a civil-law judicial precedent plays only
a supporting role. The Civil Code is the primary source of law, and precedent
serves merely as an example of a prior judge's interpretation and application of
legislated law.7
For a case decided within the context of the Civil Code to serve as a good
example or precedent it must illustrate that the judge followed sound legal
methodology in interpreting the law and applying it to the case. Aside from the
fundamental concept of the Civil Code as the primary source of law, valid
methodology is based upon several other principles. The Civil Code, as a human
act, is not complete, unambiguous, or free of contradiction. The judge is
nevertheless obliged to decide the case, even when no rule is provided for a
particular situation, while adhering as closely as possible to the values of the
Code in his legal reasoning.8 This means that the precedent court, in order to
set an influential example, must use the code as its starting point and apply it
directly to the case when there is a rule for the particular situation. In cases in
which there is no such rule, the court must use the code as its source of guiding
values in formulating a rule for the situation, either by analogy or by rulemaking.
Therefore, a subsequent judge can gauge how much influence the previously
decided case should have by how well the precedent court performed the
foregoing judicial process.
I intend, if I can, to lay down in more detail the basic principles of the legal
method that I believe should be followed in interpreting and applying the code.
Before doing that, however, I want to describe briefly the common-law theory
and practice of judicial precedent. After all, we are explaining legal
methodology here as a means of evaluating a judicial decision as a precedent.
Therefore, it will help to have before us the contrasting example of the common-
law doctrine of precedent before I attempt to describe a theory of civil-law
precedent more fully.
7. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1, 2, 3. Legislation, as contemplated in Civil Code articles I and
2, may include more than the Civil Code articles. This discussion is limited to the Civil Code for
the sake of theoretical simplicity. Also, through jurisprudence constante, judge-made law may take
the form of law by being accepted as custom. La. Civ. Code art. 3. See also the discussion of such
"acquiescence" in a line of decisions in Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (o.s.) 353 (La. 1821). The
theory expressed in this paper does not attempt to address all of these possibilities but only to clarify
the interpretive processes applied in dealing with the Civil Code.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 4.
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I. COMMON-LAW PRECEDENT
The basic pattern of the doctrine of common-law precedent has been aptly
described as "a process ... in which a proposition descriptive of the first case
is made into a rule of law and then applied to a ... similar situation."9 The
process involves at least three separate but closely related steps in judicial
reasoning: recognition of a similarity between cases; announcement of a rule
fashioned from the material facts of the first case; application of the rule to the
second case.' °
The common-law theory of precedent allows the court in the controversy
before it to exercise a great deal of flexibility in deciding which previous case
is sufficiently similar to be chosen as a precedent and in formulating a rule based
upon the material facts of the precedent case. That flexibility is well evidenced
by Professor Julius Stone's classical analysis of the case of Donoghue v.
Stevenson," in which a Scotswoman sought to recover damages from the
manufacturer of a bottle of ginger-beer which contained the decomposed remains
of a snail. The ginger-beer had been purchased for her at a cafe; the bottle was
made of. dark opaque glass; she drank some of the contents before the snail
floated out of the bottle; and she resultingly suffered from shock and severe
gastro-enteritis. As Professor Stone has demonstrated with reference to
Donoghue, the material facts of a case usually may be stated at various levels of
generality, each of which is correct for that case. Insofar as the rule or ratio
decidendi of the precedent case is determined by each material fact, a number
of different rationes may be extracted depending on how the material facts are
selected and generalized by the subsequent courts. For example, the agent of
harm, a dead snail, may be generalized to include any noxious element,
regardless of whether or not it is physical or foreign to the product; the vehicle
of harm, an opaque bottle of ginger beer, might be expanded to include any
container of commodities for human consumption; the plaintiff's relation to the
vehicle of harm, as donee of a purchaser from the retailer who bought directly
from defendant, might be generalized to include any person into whose hands the
product comes; and the fact as to discoverability of the agent of harm, a snail
which was not discoverable under opaque glass by inspection of any intermediate
party, could be generalized to include all noxious elements except when obvious
to the ordinary consumer.
12
Thus, the rule of the case could be tightened to hold liable only a manufac-
turer who sold directly to the plaintiff's retailer when the beverage is sold in
opaque containers and the consumer is made physically ill by ingesting liquid
containing a noxious foreign physical substance. Or it might be widened to hold
9. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 (1951).
10. Id.
11. (1932) A.C. 562.
12. Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings 267-74 (1964).
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any manufacturer for any harm caused by any noxious quality of its product,
regardless of how packaged, to any person into whose hands it comes.
Any honest description of the use of precedent in Anglo-American law must
admit the following: First, there is no single correct method for determining the
rule for which a case stands. Consequently, there usually can be more than one
acceptable formulation of the rule to be extracted from a precedent, and any rule
extracted from a case is subject to two types of creative judicial activity:
narrowing of the rule by admitting some exception not before considered and
widening of the rule by discarding a restriction in the rule as formulated from the
earlier case, on the ground that it has not been required previously by any rule
of statute or precedent.13
This is not the time to set forth the theory of common-law precedent in
detail. Much more can and has been said on the subject. But what I am trying
to do now is only to show that the common-law theory of precedent is extremely
flexible and that judges using case-law techniques can freely expand, contract,
and manipulate the ratio decidendi of a previously decided case. In short, unlike
the civilian legal methodology, the common-law case techniques are designed to
allow the judge to be the primary lawmaker and the previously decided case to
be his primary source of law. This is antithetical to a civilian legal system
which mandates legislation as the primary source of law. 4
II. CIVIL-LAW METHODOLOGY
Civilian legal methodology is designed to serve the practical ends of law as
set forth in the Civil Code. It aims at finding those principles which judges
should follow in deciding cases, and, therefore, is important not only for judges
but for all legal scholars who wish to assist judges in their functions." The
central debate over legal method in civil-law jurisdictions stems from the
argument that the Civil Code contains a complete and perfect system of laws
from which principles may be deduced for the just resolution of all controversies
within its purview, regardless of whether each newly arising case or problem had
been envisioned by the drafters. This view was not held by the drafters of the
French Civil Code, which was adopted before the mechanical conception of the
judicial process gained its greatest popularity. 6 As was recognized by Portalis:
A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before a
thousand unexpected issues come to face the judge. For laws, once
drafted, remain as they were written. Men, on the contrary, are never
13. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 131 (1961).
14. See Mitchell Franklin, The Annotation of the Civil Code Texts on Obligations, 33 Reports
of the La. St. Bar Ass'n. for 1933 and 1934 100, 102 (1935).
15. Philipp Heck, The Jurisprudence of Interests: An Outline, in The Jurisprudence of Interests
31, 31 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans., 1948) [hereinafter Heck, Jurisprudence of Interests].
16. von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 1, at 1137-38.
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at rest; they are constantly active, and their unceasing activities, the
effects of which are modified in many ways by circumstances, produce
at each instant some new combination, some new fact, some new
result. 7
At later periods, French thinking came closer to that of the drafters of the
German Civil Code, who viewed the codified, legislatively given law as a
perfect, complete and self-contained system.' 8
Conceptual or mechanical theory of jurisprudence believed that general legal
concepts, such as the contract being the law between the parties to it, "were the
causal basic concepts of law, that they were perceptions and notions which
caused legal rules and thereby, indirectly, the effects of rules on social life."' 9
This theory of causality is abandoned today.20
Greatly as opinions differ concerning the origin of law, there is general
agreement to the effect that historically legal commands precede the
formation and arrangement of general concepts. Commands result from
the practical needs of life and their evaluation and adjustment, and not
from notions of general concepts....
As a rule, the legislative history of modern statutes is fully known,
so that we are able to perceive the motivating forces behind them. The
struggle is not for accuracy of definitions of concepts or consistent
application of definitions agreed upon; it is a struggle for the protection
of interests.... Law is, from the point of view of history, the product
of interests. This may be taken to be the generally accepted view
today.2'
Reacting against the trend of conceptualism in France and Europe, Francois
G6ny in 1899, in his classic work, Method of Interpretation and Sources of
Private Positive Law, issued a powerful and extremely influential statement of
a non-mechanical conception of the judicial process. G6ny's theory of "free
scientific research ' 22 provides that judges are bound by the text of the written
law only when, and to the extent that, the text is clear. Otherwise, they must
17. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 762, 769 (1969) (citing
Portalis' Preliminary Discourse, M. Shael Herman trans.).
18. von Mehren & Gordley, supra note I, at 1137.
19. Heck, Jurisprudence of Interests, supra note 15, at 33-34. At least insofar as the Civil Law
developed in Germany, the theory of the causality of general concepts came into power through the
Historical School of jurisprudence. The Historical School taught that law originated in the
subconscious mind of the people and that in an advanced stage of civilization jurists and
jurisprudence took over the role of the people in creating concepts. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id. at 34-35.
22. Jaro Mayda, G'ny's Mthode After 60 Years: A Critical hitroductio,, in Frangois Gdny,
Mdthode d'Interprdtation et Sources en Droit Privd Positif v, x (Louisiana State Law Institute trans.,
2d ed. 1954).
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consider, within the context of the basic principles and values reflected in the
legal system as a whole, the social, economic, and moral factors involved in the
particular case and arrive at a rule that best promotes justice and social utility for
the given situation. 23 The Swiss Civil Code in its famous Article 1, provided
that judges should decide cases not clearly covered by the text of the code on the
basis of customary law or, where no such rule exists, in accordance with the
rules that the judge would have established as a legislator. a
In Germany the Jurisprudence of Interests school of legal thought was one
of several that promoted a nonmechanical approach to the judicial process.
Philipp Heck, the leader of this school, summarized its principles:
What the legislator intends is the protection of interests. He wishes to
delimitate conflicting interests. At the same time, however, he realizes
that he is unable to capture the variety of life situations and to regulate
them so completely that logical subsumption furnishes the correct
delimitation in each individual case. The legislator can put into effect
his intentions and satisfy the demands of practical life only if the judge
is more than a legal automaton functioning according to the laws of
logical mechanics. What our law and our life need is a judge who
stands by the legislator's side as an intelligent helpmate, who does not
merely consider the words and the commands of the law but who enters
into the intentions of the legislator and applies the value judgments
embodied in the law to situations not expressly regulated by the law,
with the aid of his own evaluation of interests.25
In my opinion, the legal method that should be applied in interpreting and
applying the Louisiana Civil Code is substantially the same as the nonmechanical
methodology advocated by Portalis and Gdny with additions and modifications
taken from the works of Philipp Heck, Heinrich Stoll, and other scholars of the
Jurisprudence of Interests school. In essence, a nonmechanical judicial process
treats the Civil Code, the courts, and the public with more honesty and respect
than a methodology based on the fiction that the legal order is a "complete,"
"gapless" system of legal concepts that was intended to be an inexhaustible
source of new material and that for each concrete factual situation a decision
must be deducible from existing abstract legal rules by means of juridical logic.
I believe that most Louisiana judges would agree that it is more honest and
realistic to admit that our code is not complete or unambiguous and that courts
must sometimes evaluate conflicting interests and formulate rules for particular
23. von Mehren & Gordley, supra note I, at 1138.
24. Max Rilmelin, Developments in Legal Theory and Teaching During My Lifetime, in The
Jurisprudence of Interests 3, 23 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans., 1948).
25. Philipp Heck, The Formation of Concepts and the Jurisprudence of Interests, in The
Jurisprudence of Interests 101, 103-04 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans., 1948) [hereinafter Heck, The
Fomiation of Concepts].
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situations either with or without the benefit of a code analogue. Indeed, Article
4 of our Civil Code, and the legislative history of the French Civil Code, indicate
that the Code was never intended to be a gapless system of legal rules, or to
comprise such a system in latent form, or to be treated as such for the purposes
of applying the law. Our colleague, Judge Albert Tate, Jr., observed that:
as a practicing state appellate judge for twenty-five years prior to my
federal service, I must confess that instances arise with increasing
frequency in the present day in which, with all the judicial good faith
in the world, no real legislative intent or text can be found to have been
intended to govern a particular new conflict of interest.
2 6
My own experience has been similar. Therefore, I believe that, if judges were
confined to a function of subsuming facts under concepts deduced or construed
from abstract legal rules, the jurisprudence would be less in touch with reality
and more legalistic because judges and lawyers are more apt to disagree and split
hairs about abstract concepts than the real human interests in conflict in
particular situations."
One of the most striking examples of the courts' response to a need for the
application of the code realistically while remaining true to its principles, was the
'Louisiana Supreme Court's outstanding work in the development of our mineral
law.28 The phenomenon of oil and gas production, of course, was not foreseen
by the Civil Code. Nevertheless, beginning with the case of Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs,29 the court used the code articles relating to
servitudes by analogy to develop a complete body of mineral law. These rules
of law were not developed mechanically or by pure conceptualization; careful
attention was paid to the conflicting and competing interests of landowners,
developers, and the public at stake in this new natural resource industry.
Let us examine the legal methodology that I propose we use to evaluate
precedent in greater detail. We commonly say that, in deciding a case, the judge
selects the appropriate legal precept and applies it to the facts to reach the correct
solution. This implies that the judicial process is a quasi-mechanical activity,
somewhat like selecting the right piece for a puzzle. 0 But in the more difficult
cases, the judge faces complex choices. Not only must he often choose between
more than one legal rule that might apply, but also he can be faced with choices
as to different interpretations of the same legal concept, as well as various ways
26. Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial
Creativity, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 877, 885 (1980).
27. Francois Gdny, Mdthode d'Interprdtation et Sources en Droit Privd Positif § 220 n.606
(Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 2d ed. 1954).
28. Joe W. Sanders, The "Civil Law" in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 15 La. B.J. 15, 22
(1967).
29. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
30. von Mehren & Gordley, supra note 1, at 1129.
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that it might be applied to the facts. Often, there are multiple solutions for a
case and good arguments for each of them.
Moreover, in selecting a rule for a case, a judge must understand the nature
of a legal concept. Every legal concept is a shorthand expression for the
adjustment of a conflict of interests and for the evaluation of those interests."
The function of every legal concept is to delimit contradictory or competing
interests, and to decide the contest between two or more such interests.
Necessarily, this decision must be based on the legislator's evaluation of each
relevant interest, which in turn must rest on his value judgments emanating from
his notion of a desirable social order. 2
On the other hand, the legislator's decision as to which interest prevails and
which is vanquished has an effect on the particular interests involved. Therefore,
the judge, by analyzing the rule with a view to the basis and effect of the
legislator's decision, may ascertain its interests and value content.
Therefore, the fundamental truth that the judge must bear in mind is that
"each command of the law determines a conflict of interests; it originates from
a struggle between opposing interests, and represents as it were the resultant of
these opposing forces. Protection of interests through the law never occurs in
a vacuum." 3  As Professor Heck observes, even the granting of a copyright or
a patent operates to restrain the interest of rival writers or subsequent inventors.
Consequently, the judge must discover more than the purpose of the law, for this
reveals only the interest which has prevailed. "The concrete content of the legal
rule, the degree in which its purpose is achieved, depends upon the weight of
those interests which were vanquished."' For example, because the purpose
of every tax is to generate revenues for public expenses, the special character of
a specific tax law can be determined only by careful attention to the way in
which each class of taxpayers has been taken into consideration.
Furthermore, in considering the interests that are protected and adjusted by
the legal concept, the judge must not take a narrow view of this term. By
interests we mean all of the interests of life that compete with one another, just
as in everyday speech when we describe the demands of life as "interests." Our
use of the word includes more than material or economic interests. In creating
a legal rule or concept, the legislator also considers ethical, religious, moral
interests, the interest of justice, of equity, of the public, and the highest interests
of human kind. 6 Although we may disagree vigorously over which interest
should prevail or be vanquished in a particular case, it is self-evident that every
31. Heinrich Stoll, The Role of Concepts and Construction in the Theor of the Jurisprudence
of Interests, in The Jurisprudence of Interests 259, 260 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans., 1948).
32. Heck, The Fornation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 134.
33. Heck. Jurisprudence of interests, supra note 15, at 35.
34. Id. at 36.
35. Id.
36. Heck, The Formation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 130-31.
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statute affects these kinds of interests.37 Accordingly, the Civil Code is an
integrated system of concepts deciding conflicts of interests, a structure of
commands based on value judgments and value ideals.38
Now let us examine carefully the three basic methods which a judge may
use under the Code to select, adapt, or create a legal concept to apply in a case.
First, in a clear case, which fortunately, is the normal case, the judge must apply
the method of logical subsumption. Under our Constitution and Civil Code the
judge is bound to uphold and abide by the law. Thus, when the judge finds that
the legislator has weighed the particular constellation of interests involved in the
instant case and has formulated a rule based on such an evaluation, the judge is
absolutely bound by the legislator's delimitation of those interests, no matter if
the judge himself would reach a different result.39
Some scholars contend this logical subsumption occurs simply because it is
so clearly self-evident that the facts of the case should be classified as falling
under the rule. Others argue that an analysis of interests is not absent, but rather
is made "intuitively," without ever entering the conscious mind of the judge.4"
In any event, the simple procedure of logical subsumption should be employed
only where its result is in harmony with that which would be reached by an
analysis of interests, and when such is not the case a judge usually will
intuitively feel reluctant to make the subsumption.4'
Thus, in the case of Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp.,42 the plain language
of the Civil Code, which in the pertinent provision states that "[a]ny clause is
null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing
physical injury to the other party, 43 clearly controlled the situation where the
defendant sought by contract to limit its liability in advance for the fall the
plaintiff suffered on the defendant's premises. The plaintiff, a horse trainer,
contracted for the use of stall space at the race track. The stall space contained
a twelve foot high loft area which had no railing to protect those using it from
a possible fall. The plaintiff fell from the loft area injuring himself. The
contract of lease which the plaintiff entered into for use of the space contained
a clause which expressly required the plaintiff to hold the lessor harmless in the
event of any injury incurred as a result of using the premises. The court was
required to analyze the situation on the narrow issue of whether this clause was
binding upon the plaintiff. The court found that under the clear language of the
Code, the clause was a nullity, which could not be enforced. The interest of one
party, that it limit its liability, had been clearly vanquished in favor of the other
37. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 168.
39. Stoll, supra note 31, at 262. See also Heck, The Formation of Concepts, supra note 25,
at 178.
40. Heck, The Formation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 185.
41. Id.
42. 575 So. 2d 811 (La. 1991).
43. La. Civ. Code art. 2004.
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party's interest, that he be protected from waiver of his right to compensation for
physical injury, and no further inquiry was warranted. The judge does not need
to delve laboriously into the conflict of interests when the code article so clearly
applies to the circumstances."
Legal concepts, like the concepts of ordinary life, are not sharply defined.
Every concept has a definitive core and a penumbra which gradually shades
off.45 Thus, whether a judge must undertake a conscious analysis of interests
may depend on whether the case falls within the core or the penumbra of the
concept.
Legal subsumption may be appropriate when the legislator, knowing that he
cannot foresee all possible factual situations, nevertheless frames a concept or
rule abstractly and broadly for the very purpose of covering new and unforeseen
cases.4  Take the example in which a statute provides that "counterfeiting
money" is punishable, at a time when coins are the only form of money.
Subsequently paper money is introduced. Although all scholars do not agree, the
conclusion that counterfeiting paper money is punishable under the statute is
reached by a simple process of subsumption rather than of analogy. 7 Or, take
a case from our own jurisprudence, in which the Supreme Court held that the
abstract formulation of a code provision requiring that a will be "written" by the
notary anticipates and includes the factual situation of a typewritten will although
those machines were not specifically anticipated at the time the legislation was
enacted.4
However, in the more difficult cases logical subsumption will not be
appropriate. Our laws are sometimes inadequate, incomplete or contradictory
when confronted with the wealth and variety of actual problems that keep arising
in daily life. Whenever the judge finds such a gap in the Code, the Code
expressly requires him to decide the case anyway, implicitly requiring that he
resort either to analogy or to rulemaking in order to fashion a concept or rule to
adjust the conflict of interests in the case before him. 49
The method of analogy has always been used in the civil law.50 Although
the facts of a particular case may not have been foreseen by any code article, if
44. Stoll, supra note 31, at 261-62. Stoll explains that the subsumption of the case under the
rule is an efficient function. It enables the judge to apply complex notions from which the concept
arises without the ardor of reexamining their complexity.
45. Heck, The Formation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 147; see also Hart, supra note 13, at
119-20.
46. Stoll, supra note 31, at 263.
47. This example, used by Stoll, id., is adapted from Jhering, I Geist Des Romischen Rechts,
§ 3 n.6.
48. Prudhomme v. Savant, 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922).
49. See La. Civ. Code art. 4. See generally Heck, The Formation of Concepts. supra note 25,
at 155.
50. Heck, Jurisprudence of Interests, supra note 15, at 41. "Analogy" also includes the inverse,
argumentum e contrario. Heck, The Formation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 180-81. See also
Gdny, supra note 27, §§ 107, 165, 166.
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the same conflict of interests underlying the dispute before the court has been
expressly regulated by a legislated rule or concept, the judge must balance the
interests or resolve the conflict between them in the same manner in the instant
case. Whenever the facts of a particular case are not foreseen by the code
article, the judge must first determine the conflict of interests which underlies the
dispute. Then he must examine whether or not that same conflict of interests
underlies other factual situations which have been expressly regulated by
legislation. If the "answer is in the affirmative, he must transfer the value
decision, or the balance of interests, contained in the article to the facts of the
dispute presented before him, that is to say, he must decide the identical conflict
of interests in the same way."
For example, the court in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,52 found that
the conflict of interests between a chemical company and a fireman who was
asphyxiated while answering a call on neighboring property was substantially
identical with the conflict of interests delimited by Civil Code articles 667 and
669, which make a person strictly liable if operations on his land cause neighbors
inconvenience by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell or otherwise deprive a
neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own property. Among other precepts, the
court applied the rules of neighborhood by analogy to decide that the company
was strictly liable for damages done to the fireman by its escaping gas. As noted
by the court, "Itihe activities of man for which he may be liable without acting
negligently are to be determined after a study of the law and customs, a
balancing of claims and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm,
and a consideration of individual and societal rights and obligations."53
The judge may sometimes find himself in a position in which he is required
to resort to the method of rulemaking in order to perform his duty to decide the
case. This may happen in two situations. First, he may be required to formulate
concepts in those frequent cases where the Code refers the judge to his own
judgment,54 either by express delegation (judicial discretion),55 or by the use
of indeterminate words which demand appraisal of values, such as "fault,
56
"good faith,"57 "public order," or "public policy."58  Most of our tort and
51. Heck, Jurisprudence of Interests, supra note 15, at 41.
52. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
53. Id. at 1083, 249 So. 2d at 140 (citing Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969)).
54. Heck, Jurisprudence of Interests, supra note 15, at 41.
55. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 372, 1589, 1852, 1960, 1986, 1999, 2033, 2324.1.
56. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 112, 577, 599, 614, 628, 799, 973, 1250, 1260, 1261, 1268,
1270, 1386, 1506, 1569, 1701, 1772, 1800, 1804, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1873, 2004, 2057, 2298, 2312,
2315, 2315.2, 2323, 2324(B), 2374, 2433, 2489, 2536, 2552, 2597, 2695, 2699, 2721, 2723, 2759,
2760, 2902, 3003, 3018, 3022, 3167, 3217(9), 3237(11). "Fault" is also delineated into relative
degrees of severity in La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13).
57. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 96, 468, 486, 487, 488, 496, 518, 522, 523, 524, 528, 529.
670, 742, 1759, 1770, 1950, 1963, 1975, 1983, 1996, 2021, 2028, 2035, 2311, 2480, 2529, 2811,
2814, 2822, 2830, 2831, 3033, 3050, 3158(B), 3475, 3480, 3481, 3482, 3486, 3490, 3491, 3536.
58. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 7, 1851, 1968, 2012. 2030. 2329. 3520. 3538. 3540.
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products liability cases are examples of courts' rulemaking by evaluating and
delimiting conflicting and competing interests under the indeterminate general
concept of "fault."5 9 Langlois was an example of the court using neighborhood
articles by analogy to define "fault." Second, such an appraisal of interests on
the part of the judge is required in cases where statutory concepts or rules are
contradictory or entirely lacking, thus creating a "gap" in the Code.6 In such
cases the judge must render that decision which he would propose if he were a
legislator using his own assessment of social, economic, and moral factors, while
following the guiding ideas or values pervading the Code and the legal system
as a whole. This is the rule contained in the famous Article I of the Swiss
Code.6' It is substantively valid for the Louisiana judge as well as the Swiss
judge. This is really what is meant by the numerous provisions, such as article
4 of our Civil Code, which make it the judge's duty to decide according to
"equity," "justice," or "fairness."'62
In truth, when there is a "gap" or potential "gap" in the legislation, the judge
rarely, if ever, relies exclusively on his own independent evaluation of the
conflicting interests or the underlying social, economic and moral factors.
Usually, he relies at least in part on principles or values within the code or the
legal system in formulating a rule or concept. Recent examples of how judges
might fill gaps in the code by rulemaking appeared in Loyacano v. Loyacano
63
and Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin.6 In those cases, a minority
of the court would have found gaps in the code because of unconstitutional
gender biased provisions failing to afford men alimony and prohibiting women
from community property management, The minority would have filled the gaps
by making rules to provide equal rights for spouses as to alimony and communi-
ty property transactions. However, it is clear they would have relied to some
59. See, e.g., 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); Pitre v. Opelousas
General Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales, Inc., 484 So. 2d 110
(La. 1986); Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972); Weber v. Fidelity
& Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans
Co. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
60. Heck, Jurisprudence of hterests, supra note 15, at 41. See also the infra discussion at
notes 62-64.
61. Swiss Civ. Code art. 1 (1907) provides:
The Law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit of any
of its provisions.
Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide according to the existing
Customary Law and, in default thereof, according to the rule which he would lay down
if he had himself to act as legislator.
62. Paul Oertmann, Interests and Concepts in Legal Science, in The Jurisprudence of Interests
51, 72 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans., 1948).
63. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978) (on original hearing), id. at 314 (on rehearing), vacated sub non.
Loyacano v. LeBlanc, 440 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979). See Tate, supra note 26, at 888-92.
64. 358 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1978) (Tate, J., et al., dissenting).
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extent by analogy upon the civil-law concepts of alimony for women and
co-ownership of property found in the code.6"
Although I have not found the analysis of interests methodology articulated
frequently in our cases, most of our appellate judges seem to reach results similar
to those that the above techniques would produce. This is because a judge may
also reach a decision conforming to the principles outlined by using intuition,
aided by his sense of justice, orjudicium, as it is sometimes called. This really
means that the judge decides a case and determines the conflicting interests by
using his subconsciousness. Whether the judge decides the underlying conflict
of interests properly depends on whether he possesses the necessary fundamental
knowledge of law and life and whether any disturbing elements interfere.6 A
judge gains a judicium through his actual experience on the bench; his judicium
in various fields of law, therefore, will vary in degree reflecting cases he has
heard and decided.67 An experienced judge has gained an ability he did not
have as a novice and that is the ability to adjudicate by intuition. "What we are
dealing with are abbreviated mental operations, rendered possible by habit, that
is, the constant action of previous processes of consciousness, such as the
speaking of a language, upon the subconscious mind." 68 Judges who possess
these prerequisites and whose intuition acts with sufficient celerity, have the
judicium which is so highly regarded in the administration of justice.
Just as it happens with the intuition of any practitioner of a learned art,
however, the intuitive judgment of a judge may be influenced by unwarranted or
extraneous factors. Consequently, his intuition should be controlled by a
checking-up process involving the conscious application of the principles
explained. 69 Furthermore, the fact that we admire and respect the result reached
by a judge making brilliant use of his judicium does not mean that the
methodology of his opinion necessarily deserves emulation. In such a case, it
is necessary for the subsequent court to reconstruct the rationale of the decision
using appropriate methodology before accepting it as a persuasive example to be
followed in deciding the instant case.
It should be evident that the common-law or case-law theory of precedent
is incompatible in many ways with the legal method of deciding a case within
the context of the Civil Code. First, in a pure case-law system, the grounds of
decision in the instant case may be derived only from a previous case.
Obviously, this is contrary to the mandate of our law, particularly when the Civil
Code contains a concept of law precisely covering the instant case and
accommodating a conflict of interests identical to that before the court. Second,
when no rule for a particular situation in the instant case can be found in the
65. See id. at 299 (Tate, J., et al., dissenting); Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 304 (on original
hearing).
66. Heck, The Fornation of Concepts, supra note 25, at 182.
67. Id. at 182 n.19.
68. Id. at 182.
69. Id. at 183.
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Code, case-law methodology would lead the judge to formulate a rule exclusively
from the facts of a previous case. This is antithetical to civilian methodology,
which requires the judge to search for legal concepts in the Civil Code delimiting
a pattern of competing interests closely resembling the interests pressing for
recognition in the instant case. Instead of causing the judge to adhere as closely
as possible to the code system the case-law methodology may cause him to
depart radically from it. Finally, even when there is no legal precept in the Code
upon which the judge may fashion a rule by analogy to govern the instant case,
he still should not use pure case-law reasoning to arrive at a rule for the case.
Doing so may cause him to fashion a rule for the case by selecting facts from
a previous case in a way that is inconsistent with the guiding values of the Civil
Code system. Thus, the judge may unwittingly contribute to the creation of
amorphous case-law development inside but incompatible with the context of our
civil law.
The foregoing general propositions may be superseded, however, by the
doctrine of jurisprudence constante. When a series of decisions forms a constant
stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the same reasoning, the
doctrine accords the cases considerable persuasive authority and justifies, without
requiring, the court in abstaining from new inquiry because of its faith in the
precedents.70 Jurisprudence constante certainly does not represent legislative
force in the proper sense, such as we attach to written law or custom; for
whenever the legislature expressly rules, it cuts off further inquiry." The
doctrine is warranted on the ground that the long continuous use and influence
of precedent indicates that it is in harmony with the code, that deviation from the
precedent series more so than from a single precedent would impair the social
values protected by precedent, and that the practice suggested by the decisions
may have originated usages containing the germ of future custom.72
If the foregoing civil-law method is how lawyers and judges ought to go
about their daily task of interpreting the Civil Code and applying it to cases, it
can also be used to evaluate the performance of a judge in a previously decided
case to determine whether the case should be imitated in a subsequent decision.
If the previous judge's performance is flawed, that should cause the subsequent
court to disregard or give little weight to the precedent case. Certainly, if a
judge ignores a clearly applicable Code rule and follows another jurisdiction's
case, his example of using the wrong starting point or source of law should not
be influential at all. Similarly, if a judge misperceives the particular constellation
of interests that must be adjusted in the case before him or in the legal concept
he has selected to decide the case, a subsequent court should reject or give less
weight to the previous case. Also, when a judge overlooks a Code rule that
might have been applied by analogy, his performance may need to be disregard-
70. Gdny, supra note 27, § 149; Daggett et al., supra note 4, at 15-26.
71. Gdny, supra note 27, § 149 n.101.
72. Id. § 149 nn.104-05.
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ed or at least not blindly followed. Under the theory of precedent proposed, it
does not matter if the previous court reached the "right result." A previous case
should be imitated only when it demonstrates knowledgeable and skillful use of
the Civil Code by valid methodology. A previous case cannot be considered the
primary starting point in law, but only as an example of legal methodology
involving the evaluation of the conflict of interests presented in that case and in
the particular concept used to decide the case. Even if we can sense intuitively
that the previous case was decided justly and in harmony with Civil Code
principles, this does not make it a valid precedent. We would still need to verify
that the result was correct in the previous case by reconstructing its decision
process with valid legal methodology. Therefore, a precedent which reaches a
correct result with flawed methods can have little influence on our own decision
in a subsequent case because we are forced to verify its result only through our
own use of legal methodology, not by following the prior court's reasoning
process.
A recent example of an attempt to determine the value of a precedent may
be seen in Daigle v. Clemco Industries."1 In that case, the court was called
upon to decide whether the wife and children of a terminally ill worker could
validly compromise, before his death, their own potential wrongful death claims
against the manufacturers and executive officers who allegedly exposed him to
dangerous industrial abrasives. Civil Code article 1976 provides that future
things may be the object of a contract, except that the succession of a living
person may not be the object of a contract other than an antenuptial agreement.
In a previously decided case, a court of appeal had set aside a similar compro-
mise by reasoning that such a compromise is analogous to the sale of a living
person's succession or a contract having a succession as its object prohibited by
Article 1976."4 The supreme court, in effect, decided that the analogy was false
because the constellation of interests decided by the legal concept of Article 1976
was not the same as those presented when a person seeks to compromise a
potential wrongful death claim. One of the main conflicts that the legislator
decided by Article 1976 was between the interests of persons whose lives might
be jeopardized by pre-death sales of their successions and that of persons who
might benefit from allowing successions to be the object of a contract. In effect,
the supreme court reasoned that the same constellation of interests was not
presented by the pre-death compromise of a potential wrongful death claim
because such a transaction does not tend to jeopardize the life of any person.
Instead, the court concluded that the compromise of this type of claim was
subsumed under the general Code rules allowing persons freedom to make future
things the object of their contracts and to compromise any difference they may
have in the present or in the future. Therefore, the court concluded that the
previous court of appeal decision was "not a persuasive example of the
73. 613 So. 2d 619 (La. 1993).
74. Schiffman v. Service Truck Lines, Inc., 308 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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interpretation and application of the Code that should be followed in the present
case."
75
This brief description of legal methodology and how it may be used to
analyze judicial decisions and decide what influence they should be allowed to
have in deciding subsequent cases is by no means exhaustive. It builds on the
basic ideas of Louisiana, French, and German jurists who struggled to gain a
clearer view of the judge's role in interpreting and applying civil codes and
statutory law. Essentially, it offers a suggestion of how the thoughts of Gdny
and the Jurisprudence of Interests scholars may be used to evaluate the
methodology of a prior judicial decision to determine what weight it should be
given in deciding a subsequent case. This recommendation does not suggest that
appellate judges change the style of their opinions or even that they abandon the
common-law doctrine of precedent in areas of our law where its use is
appropriate. Louisiana is an original legal system that draws from both the
civilian and the common-law families. Our judicial process, therefore, must be
flexible enough to accommodate the variant patterns of that system and to further
the goals of justice and social utility through the different means that it has
prescribed. Accordingly, when dealing with the civil law, the judge's constitu-
tional oath.to support the law requires that he recognize that the Civil Code is
the primary source of law. Nevertheless, the limitations of the Code require the
judge to act as the legislator's helpmate by completing the rule adumbrated by
the legislation in cases not clearly foreseen by the Code. In doing so, however,
the judge does not have absolute discretion but is required to return again and
again to the Code seeking its guiding values and adhering as closely to them as
possible. This outline of legal method and theory of civil-law precedent
hopefully will help a judge to visualize this process clearly both when he is
interpreting and applying the Civil Code directly himself and when he is in the
position of evaluating a previous court's performance of this function. By thus
gaining a clear view of whether the court in the previously decided case followed
the Code and sound legal method, the jualge in the subsequent case will be in a
better position to determine what influence, if any, the prior case should have
upon his decision.
75. Daigle, 613 So. 2d at 623. See H. Alston Johnson, II1, Obligations, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term. 36 La. L. Rev. 375 (1976); Slephen D. Juge.
Note, Tort-Wrongful Death-Release of Claim Before Death of Victim, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 720 (1976).
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